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A CALL FOR STRENGTHENING THE ROLE 
OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
IRENE CALBOLI† 
INTRODUCTION 
This Essay highlights the importance of comparative legal 
analysis with particular emphasis on the role that this 
methodology could play for intellectual property scholarship in 
the United States.  In particular, the theme of this Symposium 
aims at addressing “values,” “questions,” and “methods” in 
intellectual property law.  In line with this theme, this Essay 
would like to make the case that comparative legal analysis could 
play a more prominent role as a scholarly methodology in the 
U.S. legal academy in the field of intellectual property.  In turn, 
this could have a relevant impact on the questions addressed by 
scholars and provide the opportunity for broader—or partially 
different—answers.  Thus, comparative analysis can enrich the 
discussion over the values to be promoted or protected as part of 
the intellectual property debate in the U.S.  In other words, this  
 
 
 
 
† Professor of Law, Texas A&M University Law School; Lee Kong Chian Fellow, 
Visiting Professor, and Deputy Director, Applied Research Centre for Intellectual 
Assets and the Law in Asia, Singapore Management University School of Law. This 
Essay builds upon on my research in this area and in a previously published book 
chapter: The Role of Comparative Legal Analysis in Intellectual Property Law: From 
Good to Great?, in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 
(Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2014). Accordingly, several portions of this Essay adapt 
parts of that chapter and cite several of the same sources in the footnotes. I would 
like to thank Jeremy Sheff and the St. John’s Law Review for the invitation to 
participate in the Symposium “Values, Questions, and Methods in Intellectual 
Property,” St. John’s Law School, April 22, 2016. I also thank the Symposium’s 
participants for useful conversation, comments, and suggestions, and the editors of 
the St. John’s Law Review for their editing and revisions. The (hopefully not 
controversial) views expressed in this Essay, and any mistakes, remain my own. 
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Essay suggests that U.S. scholars could consider turning with 
more frequency to comparative legal analysis as an additional 
methodology to use in their research.1 
Certainly, as other contributions in this Symposium volume 
highlight, U.S. legal scholars have pioneered and excelled in a 
large number of scholarly methodologies that are very relevant in 
the study of intellectual property law.  These are methodologies, 
such as law and economic analysis,2 empirical—quantitative and 
qualitative—analyses,3 critical legal theories,4 and a range of 
interdisciplinary methodologies including law and anthropology, 
cognitive science, and legal philosophy, just to name a few.5  Yet, 
comparative legal analysis seems to be a methodology that, 
especially in recent years, is less frequently used by mainstream 
scholars in the U.S., even though several U.S. intellectual 
property academics teach international intellectual property law 
 
1 See generally Ugo Mattei, An Opportunity Not To Be Missed: The Future of 
Comparative Law in the United States, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 709 (1998); see also 
MATHIAS SIEMS, COMPARATIVE LAW (2014); COMPARATIVE LAW: A HANDBOOK (Esin 
Orücü & David Nelken eds., 2015); COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND 
TRANSITIONS (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2011); NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt & Joakim Nergelius eds., 
2010); THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Mathias Reimann & 
Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2008). For additional references, see the secondary 
sources cited in this Essay. 
2 See, e.g., Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of 
Limiting Doctrines in Trademark Law, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A 
HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 65 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. 
Janis eds., 2009); 1 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE LAW: 
THE COLLECTED ECONOMIC ESSAYS OF RICHARD A. POSNER (Francesco Parisi ed., 
2001); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The 
Economics of Trademark Law, 78 TRADEMARK REP. 267 (1988). 
3 See, e.g., JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH: CREATORS, INNOVATORS, AND 
EVERYDAY INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2015); Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of 
U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008); Barton 
Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 
CALIF. L. REV. 1581 (2006); Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests of 
Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921 (2014); 
Christopher J. Sprigman et al., What's a Name Worth?: Experimental Tests of the 
Value of Attribution in Intellectual Property, 93 B.U. L. REV. 1389 (2013). 
4 See, e.g., Ann Bartow, Fair Use and the Fairer Sex: Gender, Feminism, and 
Copyright Law, 14 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 551 (2006); Rebecca Tushnet, 
My Fair Ladies: Sex, Gender, and Fair Use in Copyright, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 273 (2007). 
5 See, e.g., DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IDENTITIES, INTERESTS, AND 
INTERSECTIONS (Irene Calboli & Srividhya Ragavan eds., 2015); ROBERT P. MERGES, 
JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011); MADHAVI SUNDER, FROM GOODS TO A 
GOOD LIFE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND GLOBAL JUSTICE (2012). 
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in U.S. law schools.6  Moreover, comparative legal analysis seems 
to be used by U.S. scholars to a lesser extent than scholars in 
other jurisdictions.  This consideration is not unique to 
intellectual property scholarship.7  Hence, more attention could 
be paid by U.S. scholars to foreign jurisdictions—in terms of 
scholarship discourse, but also foreign legislation, judicial 
decisions, and legal practice—as this could only benefit research 
in the U.S.  As Martha Minow pointedly noted in 2010, 
“[n]eglecting . . . comparative law could vitiate the vitality, 
nimbleness, and effectiveness of [national] law or simply leave us 
without the best tools and insights as we design and run 
institutions, pass legislation, and work to govern ourselves.”8  
While this observation was not directed in particular to the 
intellectual property scholars in the U.S., it is certainly an 
important observation also in this respect. 
Yet, while this Essay supports that comparative legal 
analysis could currently play a more prominent role as scholarly 
methodology among U.S. intellectual property scholars, its 
objective is not to suggest that U.S. scholars should engage in 
comparative legal analysis in lieu of other types of research 
methodologies, or that U.S. scholars are not generally interested 
in comparative legal analysis or the study of foreign laws.  As a 
U.S. scholar by adoption, I have never found a more welcoming 
and generous community toward foreign scholars than the 
academic community in the U.S.  This community is, in fact, to 
be applauded and imitated abroad because of its generosity in 
sharing knowledge openly with scholars—both junior and senior 
scholars—from all over the world.  Instead, this Essay simply 
supports that comparative legal analysis could play a larger role 
compared to the one that it currently seems to play amongst U.S. 
 
6 For an overview related to the teaching of international intellectual property 
in the U.S., see Peter K. Yu, Teaching International Intellectual Property Law, 52 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 923 (2008). See also Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Intellectual 
Property Curriculum: Findings of Professor and Practitioner Surveys, 49 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 203 (1999); Kenneth L. Port, Intellectual Property Curricula in the United 
States, 46 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 165 (2005). 
7 For criticism towards the lack of engagement of U.S. scholars and students 
with comparative law, see generally Vivian Grosswald Curran, Dealing in 
Difference: Comparative Law’s Potential for Broadening Legal Perspectives, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 657 (1998). 
8 Martha Minow, The Controversial Status of International and Comparative 
Law in the United States, HARV. INT’L L.J. (Aug. 27, 2010), http://www.harvardilj. 
org/2010/08/online_52_minow. 
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intellectual property academics, and that a larger number of U.S. 
scholars could turn to comparative legal analysis in some 
instances in conjunction with other research methodologies while 
conducting research in intellectual property law.  This would 
allow more scholars in the U.S. to consider the experiences of 
other jurisdictions as additional examples—positive, negative, 
relevant, or perhaps ultimately not relevant—while elaborating 
their research questions in the field of intellectual property and 
developing the answers to these questions. 
In this respect, this Essay also advocates that, in order for a 
larger number of scholars to engage in comparative legal analysis 
in the area of intellectual property law, the barriers to entry to 
conduct this analysis should be kept low—that is, scholars should 
not be required to necessarily conduct research in other 
languages or spend lengthy periods of time visiting foreign 
institutions, at least initially.  In particular, this Essay disagrees 
with the position of some comparative law scholars who have 
supported an increasingly complex set of methodologies and 
requirements in the field of comparative law, including the fact 
that scholars desiring to engage in comparative legal analysis 
should be fully immersed in the foreign culture, spend time in 
foreign countries, read texts in foreign languages, and so forth.9  
Certainly, such full immersion in foreign cultures is to be 
welcome when scholars have the opportunity, the time, and the 
foreign language expertise to do so.  However, this Essay argues 
that fewer scholars may be able to conduct comparative legal 
analysis at all if the requirements to engage with this 
methodology become too complex.  Instead, this Essay supports a 
simpler approach, one based upon incremental steps, in which 
any U.S. scholar should feel welcome to conduct—and be praised 
for conducting—some degree of comparative legal analysis as 
part of her or his research in the area of intellectual property 
law.  With time, it is the conviction of this author that many 
scholars will certainly also deepen their interest and further 
immerse themselves in the local legal culture, language, etc.  
Hence, such full immersion should not become a sine qua non for 
scholars who desire to conduct comparative legal analysis, in  
 
 
 
9 See discussion infra Part II. 
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particular at an early stage of their research and when this 
analysis is combined with and used to support other research 
methodologies. 
Finally, this Essay does not advocate that comparative legal 
analysis should be used to lead to a convergence of scholarly 
positions between U.S. and foreign intellectual property scholars.  
Certainly, comparative legal analysis may lead to convergence of 
opinions when the models of foreign jurisdictions could be 
usefully applied into national contexts.  In several instances, 
comparative analysis can also positively influence legal reforms 
or the adoption of new laws nationally.  Still, comparative legal 
analysis can, and at times should, lead to divergence in positions, 
or to the reinforcement of the fact that diverging national 
positions may be the best suited in several circumstances.  
Ultimately, this Essay only supports that the importance and 
true objective of this methodology lies on the fact that it can raise 
awareness about, and increase the knowledge of, the norms, 
cases, and theoretical debates about certain topics in more than 
one jurisdiction.  In turn, this additional set of information can 
offer to scholars the possibility to conduct a better informed 
scholarly analysis of a variety of issues.  But, it remains up to 
individual scholars to decide how to use this additional 
information, based on their specific research topic and other 
circumstances of their research question. 
I. A BRIEF PRIMER OF COMPARATIVE LAW AND COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
What is comparative law?  And what is the difference, if any, 
between comparative law and comparative legal analysis?  As I 
elaborate below, these questions encapsulate one the most 
debated issues among comparative law scholars—the scope of 
comparative law as its own independent legal field—and the 
answer to these questions is not a straightforward one. 
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At the outset, the general definition of comparative law is 
the “comparison of different legal systems of the world.”10  
Building on this definition, comparative legal analysis is defined 
as the method used by scholars, or other legal experts, in order to 
conduct such comparison.  These definitions originate from the 
observation that those who engage in comparative legal analysis 
are required to conduct a comparison between the laws, judicial 
decisions, or legal practices of two or more different legal 
systems.11  And, generally, this comparison leads to drawing 
some specific conclusions about the systems compared.  Thus, the 
definition of comparative law reflects the element of comparison, 
which is required in this field of law. 
Methodologically, those who engage in comparative law can 
compare any specific legal topic or set of issues—from 
constitutional law to criminal law to intellectual property, and so 
forth.  In particular, this comparison is conducted by first 
analyzing one or more foreign legal systems and later 
juxtaposing these systems against other legal systems.  This 
often includes the national systems of those conducting the 
comparison,12 even though, in several instances, scholars may 
compare two or more foreign systems without any reference to 
their national jurisdictions.13  With respect to those areas of the 
world that have undergone, or are undergoing, international or 
regional harmonization—such as in the field of intellectual 
property or European Union (“EU”) law—experts also frequently 
analyze and juxtapose the international or regional system with 
one or more national systems that have undergone the process of 
international or regional harmonization of laws.14 
 
10 Irene Calboli, The Role of Comparative Legal Analysis in Intellectual Property 
Law: From Good to Great?, in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 6 n.5 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2014) (quoting KONRAD ZWEIGERT & 
HEIN KOTZ, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW: THE FRAMEWORK 7 (1977)). 
For a general overview and the academic debate on the definition of comparative 
law, see the contributions published in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE 
LAW (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006). See also, e.g., 
COMPARATIVE LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (Vivan Grosswald Curran ed., 2002). 
11 For an exhaustive overview of how to conduct comparative legal analysis, see 
Edward J. Eberle, The Methodology of Comparative Law, 16 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. 
REV. 51, 52 (2011). 
12 Id. 
13 See id. 
14 For example, the implications and application of comparative legal analysis in 
the area of European Union law is well detailed in MARKKU KIIKERI, COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL REASONING AND EUROPEAN LAW (Francisco Laporta et al. eds., Springer 
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Yet, despite its importance, and the fact that comparative 
legal analysis is routinely used in a large variety of legal fields 
and contexts in today’s integrated world, some considerable 
uncertainty still dominates this field.  In particular, no 
agreement has been reached—and perhaps never will—over 
whether comparative law has developed into an independent 
substantive field of law or simply constitutes a “legal method” for 
comparing the laws of different countries.15  In this respect, the 
main criticism against comparative law as an independent field 
of law rests precisely on the fact that comparative law requires 
objects of comparison and that, unlike other fields of law, does 
not have, nor relies on, specific sets of written rules.  This 
criticism originates primarily from the civil law system, a system 
that generally uses codes to “legitimize[] legal discourse.”16  
Hence, comparative law lacks its own set of rules or codes.  
Instead, scholars engaging in comparative legal anaysis 
generally compare national or regional rules, judicial decisions, 
legal reforms, and so forth.  In other words, comparative law 
scholars engage with already exisisting rules that are part of the 
specific—national or regional—legal norms applicable in the 
countries that are the objects of the scholarly comparison.17 
Against this obervation, however, several experts have 
underscored that there is a large amount of epistemological 
debate that has been generated by comparative law scholars to 
date, regardless of the absence of an independent set of written 
norms in this field.18  Notably, these experts have supported that 
 
Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2001), and REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, 
COMPARATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF A EUROPEAN LAW OF SET-OFF AND PRESCRIPTION 
(2010). 
15 See, e.g., James Gordley, Is Comparative Law a Distinct Discipline?, 46 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 607, 611 (1998); Mathias Reimann, The Progress and Failure of 
Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 
671, 673 (2002). 
16 Fabio Morosini, Globalization & Law: Beyond Traditional Methodology of 
Comparative Legal Studies and an Example from Private International Law, 13 
CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 541, 544 (2005). For a comprehensive introduction to 
the civilian tradition, see JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, 
THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE 
AND LATIN AMERICA (3rd ed. 2007), and REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, ROMAN LAW, 
CONTEMPORARY LAW, EUROPEAN LAW: THE CIVILIAN TRADITION TODAY (2004). 
17 See Morosini, supra note 16, at 543 (citing RENÉ DAVID, LES GRANDS 
SYSTEMES DE DROIT CONTEMPORAINS (DROIT COMPARE) 1 (1964)). 
18 See the contributions published in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW (Mark Van Hoecke ed., 2004). 
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this “epistemological debate” is sufficient to categorize 
comparative law, at a minimum, as a legitimate and scientifically 
based model for comparative legal studies if not as its 
autonomous field of law.19 
Despite these disputes over the nature of this field of law, 
scholars seem to nevertheless agree on the main objectives of 
comparative law: (1) to investigate the historical, philosophical, 
economic, and social aspects related to national laws; (2) to use 
this information to further understand different national or 
regional legal systems, which may be the legal systems of the 
scholars, but also unrelated systems; and (3) to better 
understand different legal systems, which may ultimately benefit 
the development of national laws, as much as regional and 
international laws, and in turn international relations.20  To 
achieve these objectives scholars should thus engage in 
comparative legal analysis.  Still, while the objective of 
comparative law seems less controversial, scholars do not 
necessarily agree on how to achieve these objectives21—that is, on 
the specific methods and requirements on how to conduct 
comparative legal analysis.  Not surprisingly, this has led to 
additional controversy in this area.22 
For example, scholars frequently disagree on whether 
comparative legal analysis should primarily—or exclusively—
consider the written law, including judicial decisions, of the 
countries that are compared, or whether comparative scholars 
should instead also consider the countries’ social, cultural, and 
 
19 Morosini, supra note 16, at 544. 
20 See, e.g., Nora V. Demleitner, Combating Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative 
Law Sets Boundaries, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 737, 739–40 (1999); Eberle, supra note 11, at 
52–53; see also, e.g., Pierre Legrand, The Same and the Different, in COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday 
eds., 2003); Pierre Legrand, On the Singularity of Law, 47 HARV. INT’L L.J. 517, 
524–25 (2006); Pierre Legrand, Foreign Law: Understanding Understanding, 6 J. 
COMP. L. 67, 68 (2011). 
21 For a critical review of the objectives of comparative law and legal analysis, 
see Vernon Valentine Palmer, From Lerotholi to Lando: Some Examples of 
Comparative Law Methodology, 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 261 (2005) (advocating against a 
single methodology for comparative law and for a sliding scale of options depending 
on the specific research). “Mainstream comparative lawyers . . . seem to be caught in 
the pincers of three developments, each pulling in a different direction.” Id. at 263. 
The observations developed in this Essay with respect to comparative legal analysis 
in the field of intellectual property have been particularly inspired by this article. 
22 Id. at 264; see also Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of 
Methodology, 84 IOWA L. REV. 1025, 1066 (1999). 
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anthropological environments.  Moreover, scholars tend to 
disagree over whether the role of comparative law should be 
limited to comparing existing legal systems, or whether 
comparative law ought to play a larger role in understanding 
public policy issues and the political/historical/sociological 
background related to the national legal systems that are being 
studied.  Scholars are also divided on whether comparative legal 
analysis should focus on the similarities between the legal 
systems that are compared, or on their differences.23  For 
example, some scholars support focusing on the similarities of 
varying legal systems because the solutions to similar problems 
are frequently similar across different systems—the “convergence 
approach.”24  Other scholars have argued, instead, that different 
systems should be read within their different cultural 
framework—the “non-convergence approach.”25  In this respect, 
one of the few points of agreement seems to be that comparative 
legal analysis should not focus merely on legal texts or case law, 
but also on the “law in action,” including the underlying “legal 
formants.”26 
The result of the existing controversies has been that 
comparative law scholars have developed a variety of 
increasingly more complex methodologies to conduct comparative 
legal analysis.  These methodologies go from “historical [to] 
functional, evolutionary, structural, thematic, empirical, and 
statistical comparison, and all . . . can be carried out from a micro 
or macro point of view.”27  In the same context, some scholars 
 
23 See the insightful chapter by H. Patrick Glenn, Legal Cultures and Legal 
Traditions, in EPISTEMOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 7 (Mark 
Van Hoecke ed., 2004). See also Günter Frankenberg, Stranger Than Paradise: 
Identity and Politics in Comparative Law, UTAH L. REV. 259, 260 (1997); Curran, 
supra note 7, at 661. 
24 For a detailed argument in defense of this approach, see BASIL MARKESINIS, 
FOREIGN LAW AND COMPARATIVE METHODOLOGY 6 (1997). See also Gerhard 
Dannemann, Comparative Law: Study of Similarities or Differences?, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 383 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard 
Zimmermann eds., 2006). 
25 In this respect, see Pierre Legrand, European Legal Systems Are Not 
Converging, 45 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 52, 55 (1996). See generally PIERRE LEGRAND, 
FRAGMENTS ON LAW-AS-CULTURE (1999). 
26 Demleitner, supra note 20, at 741; see also Mark Van Hoecke & Mark 
Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New 
Model for Comparative Law, 47 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 495, 498 (1998). 
27 Palmer, supra note 21, at 263. 
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have also developed a functionalist approach28 and a law and 
economics approach to comparative law.29  Hence, this 
proliferation of methodologies has—rightly for this author—been 
denounced as a deterrent and additional challenge against a 
wider acceptance of comparative legal analysis.30  In particular, 
critics have pointed out how conducting comparative legal 
analysis, even at a most fundamental level, is already complex 
due to the extra challenge of acquiring and analyzing information 
about foreign laws.31  Accordingly, the already not indifferent 
challenges that characterize comparative legal analysis should 
not transform into an excessive burden for those attempting to 
engage in legal comparison.  As I elaborate below, this Essay 
supports that we should instead accept that comparative analysis 
can be conducted at different levels of expertise, and in different 
ways, and that scholars may extend their comparative analysis 
skills and methods incrementally and with time, as they achieve 
satisfactory results and become more comfortable with the 
methodology themselves.32  In particular, as noted by one 
commentator, this Essay supports that comparative legal 
 
28 A functional approach to comparative legal analysis has been defined as an 
approach that proposes a “flexible, inductive process of preliminary hypotheses, 
investigation of functional values, checking of preliminary results and reformulation 
of hypotheses.” David C. Donald, Approaching Comparative Company Law, 14 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 83, 88 (2008) (citing KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KOTZ, 
INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 33–34 (3d ed. 1998)); see, e.g., Ralf Michaels, 
The Functional Method of Comparative Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
COMPARATIVE LAW 339 (Mathias Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2008); see 
also Michele Graziadei, The Functionalist Heritage, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 101 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday 
eds., 2011). 
29 In this respect, see the leading publication by UGO MATTEI, COMPARATIVE 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 1, 10 (2004). 
30 Palmer, supra note 21, at 263; see also Catherine A. Rogers, Gulliver’s 
Troubled Travels, or the Conundrum of Comparative Law, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
149, 150–51, 163 (1998). 
31 For example, some of the additional challenges that are part of comparative 
legal analysis are: unfamiliarity with different legal systems, intrinsic differences 
between the common law and the civilian traditions, language barriers, and the 
difficulties in effectively understanding a foreign legal system due to language 
translations are just system. See generally Vivian Grosswald Curran, Comparative 
Law and Language, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE LAW 675 (Mathias 
Reimann & Reinhard Zimmermann eds., 2006) (highlighting the importance of 
learning foreign languages). 
32 Palmer, supra note 21, at 263 (noting that some of the proposed scholarly 
methodologies “overlook the comparative law needs of the legislatures, reform 
commissions, and judges and seem entirely unworkable at the practical level”). 
FINAL_CALBOLI 2/14/2017  10:46 PM 
2016] COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE U.S. 619 
analysis should be based on methods that “are not only 
enlightening, but [are] feasible and nonthreatening.”33  In this 
way, a larger number of scholars may—hopefully—become 
interested in this methodology and feel welcome to engage with 
it.  With time, this incremental approach may lead to more 
comparative legal analysis, which in turn could lead to the 
creation of a larger group of scholars and experts valuing legal 
comparison as a methodological tool in their research. 
II. THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW GLOBALLY 
Unquestionably, comparative legal analysis is a widely 
adopted academic research methodology in the field of 
intellectual property law in many jurisdictions today.  The 
popularity of comparative legal analysis compared to other fields 
of law is certain in this respect, despite the many differences that 
still apply to how individual scholars may conduct this analysis 
based on their topics of research and the jurisdictions that they 
are comparing.34  Besides academic research, the importance of 
understanding foreign legal systems is widely recognized by 
intellectual property practitioners, lawmakers, and members of 
the judiciary in a large number of countries.  Academic 
institutions and professional training centers across many 
countries have also long realized the importance of comparative  
 
 
 
33 Id. 
34 The literature in this respect is very extensive, and it is not possible to cite 
the many excellent works that have been published by many colleagues in various 
countries, and in many different languages. To review some examples in English, see 
Andrew F. Christie & Amanda Lim, Reach-through Patent Claims in Biotechnology: 
An Analysis of the Examination Practices of the United States, European and 
Japanese Patent Offices, INTELL. PROP. Q., Vol. 3, 236 (2005); Giuseppina 
D’Agostino, Healing Fair Dealing? A Comparative Copyright Analysis of Canada’s 
Fair Dealing to U.K. Fair Dealing and U.S. Fair Use, 53 MCGILL L.J. 309, 309 
(2008); Daniel J. Gervais, Feist Goes Global: A Comparative Analysis of The Notion 
of Originality in Copyright Law, 49 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 949, 951 (2002); Jane 
C. Ginsburg, The Concept of Authorship in Comparative Copyright Law, 52 DEPAUL 
L. REV. 1063, 1071 (2003); see, e.g., Estelle Derclaye, Can and Should 
Misappropriation Also Protect Databases? A Comparative Approach, in COPYRIGHT 
LAW: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 83 (Paul Torremans ed., 2007); 
Irene Calboli, Recent Developments in the Law of Comparative Advertising in Italy—
Towards an Effective Enforcement of the Principles of Directive 97/55/EC under the 
New Regime?, 33 INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. COPYRIGHT L. 415 (2002). 
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legal studies, and generally offer a large array of academic 
subjects in international and comparative intellectual property 
rights in their curricula.35 
The rise of comparative legal analysis as an important legal 
methodology in the field of intellectual property—at least modern 
intellectual property—dates back to the nineteenth century.  
Almost one-and-a-half centuries ago, the need to facilitate trade 
by securing similar protections for products that were distributed 
internationally resulted in the adoption of wide-reaching 
international agreements that set minimal national standards 
for intellectual property protection.  The most relevant 
agreements in this respect were the adoption of the 1883 Paris 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property36 and the 
1886 Berne Convention.37  These agreements were soon followed 
by the adoption of several additional international agreements.38  
Thus, it does not come as a surprise that, shortly after their 
adoption, scholars started to invest significant ink in analyzing 
these agreements and their history, negotiations, and process of 
implementation into national laws.  In turn, scholars extensively 
compared national legal systems with the international rules.39  
Throughout the twentieth century many scholars engaged in a 
variety of comparative legal analyses in the area of intellectual 
 
35 The World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”) Academy in Geneva 
offers a comprehensive list of academic and professional intellectual property 
centers. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, THE WIPO ACADEMY 
EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAMS PORTFOLIO (2016), http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_467_2016.pdf. 
36 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 13 
U.S.T. 2, 828 U.N.T.S. 107, as last revised at the Stockholm Revision Conference 
July 14, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 1538, 828 U.N.T.S. 303. 
37 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9 
1886, as last revised July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221. 
38 See WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION, http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en (last visited Oct. 22, 2016), for an 
exhaustive list, the legal texts, and a comprehensive summary of the various 
international treaties currently administered by the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO). See also WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, 
WIPO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HANDBOOK: POLICY, LAW AND USE (2004), 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/intproperty/489/wipo_pub_489.pdf. 
39 See G.H.C. BODENHAUSEN, GUIDE TO THE APPLICATION OF THE PARIS 
CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (1968); SAM 
RICKETSON, THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND 
ARTISTIC WORKS: 1886–1986 (1987); 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE C. GINSBURG, 
INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE CONVENTION 
AND BEYOND (2d ed. 2006). 
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property law.  This trend continued and intensified after the 
adoption of the 1994 Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”).40  In particular, post-
TRIPS, a large number of scholars have compared the 
implementation of TRIPS into the national laws of their 
countries or other countries members of the World Trade 
Organization.41  More recently, scholars have started to discuss 
the impact of the gridlock in multilateral negotiations on 
national legislation, such as the impasse in the WTO 
negotiations and the subsequent shift towards bilateralism and 
plurilateralism—that is, the rise of intellectual property 
discussion in international trade agreements (“FTAs”).42 
Besides comparing international intellectual property law 
and national laws, a large number of scholars have also 
compared separate national legal systems in past years and 
decades.  These comparisons have interested a large variety of 
intellectual property topics and jurisdictions.43  Unfortunately, I 
 
40 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round vol. 31, 33 I.LM. 81 (1994) 
[hereinafter TRIPs]; see also DANIEL GERVAIS, THE TRIPS AGREEMENT: DRAFTING 
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS (3d ed. 2008). 
41 For an example of national implementation of TRIPS, see generally George 
Wei, Comparison of TRIPs Provisions with the Current Intellectual Property Laws of 
Singapore, 1 SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 154 (1997). See also ASSAFA ENDESHAW, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIAN EMERGING ECONOMIES: LAW AND POLICY IN THE 
POST-TRIPS ERA (2010); Gail. E. Evans, Substantive Trademark Law 
Harmonization: On the Emerging Coherence Between the Jurisprudence of the WTO 
Appellate Body and the ECJ, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 177 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2009); 
2 RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE INTERPRETATION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY UNDER WTO RULES (Carlos M. Correa ed., 2012). 
42 For an example of analysis of an international trade agreement including 
intellectual property provisions, see United States-Singapore Free Trade Agreement, 
U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, , https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/ 
fta/singapore/asset_upload_file708_4036.pdf. See generally INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION (Christoph Antons & 
Reto M. Hilty eds., 2015); TRIPS PLUS 20: FROM TRADE RULES TO MARKET 
PRINCIPLES (Hanns Ullrich et al. eds., 2016); Ng Siew Kuan Elisabeth, The Impact of 
the Bilateral US Singapore Free Trade Agreement on Singapore post-TRIPS Patent 
Regime in the Context of Pharmaceuticals, 16 INT’L TRADE LAW AND REGULATION 
121 (2010); Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Time to Rethink the Ever Expanding Concept of 
Trademark: The Careful Re-calibration in Singapore Trademark Law after the 
Controversial US/Singapore FTA, 30 E.I.P.R. 5 (2008). 
43 See, e.g., Herman Cohen Jehoram, Harmonising Intellectual Property Law 
Within the European Community, 23 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 
622 (1992); Jean-Luc Piotraut, European National IP Laws Under the EU Umbrella: 
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cannot comprehensively elaborate on nor mention all these 
excellent comparative works in this Essay.  Yet the large amount 
of comparative scholarship available today—in several different 
languages—confirms the scholarly interest in, and the relevance 
of, this methodology in the field of intellectual property. 
Still, from the existing body of works in this area, the 
following general criteria could be observed with respect to 
scholars engaging in this methodology.  Namely, similar to 
scholars in other fields, intellectual property scholars tend to 
turn to comparative legal analysis in order to: (1) acquire 
information about foreign legal systems; (2) compare this 
information with domestic law or the law of another legal system; 
and (3) attempt to draw conclusions with respect to the foreign or 
national legal systems.  More specifically, scholars tend to 
compare different legal systems to support or reject legislative 
changes at the national level by adapting, fully embracing, or 
rejecting as unsuccessful the findings of comparative analysis.  
Scholars also compare different legal systems in order to 
determine the effectiveness of regional and international 
harmonization efforts.  In turn, these determinations provide a 
basis to support or reject further harmonization efforts with 
respect to a specific topic at the national political level.44  With 
respect to the scope of their research, scholars generally seem to 
investigate written laws and judicial decisions as well as, in some 
instances, the legislative history and ongoing legislative reforms 
with respect to a specific topic.  These results are then compared 
and applied to their findings on similar issues at the national or 
regional level in different countries worldwide.45 
 
From National to European Community IP Law, 2 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 61 
(2005); see also Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 
Study on the Overall Functioning of the European Trade Mark System, EUROPA 
(Feb. 2, 2011), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/indprop/docs/tm/20110308_allens 
bach-study_en.pdf (presenting the results of a study commissioned by the European 
Commission with respect to trademark law harmonization in the EU). 
44 See, e.g., MIREILLE VAN EECHOUD ET AL., HARMONIZING EUROPEAN 
COPYRIGHT LAW: THE CHALLENGES OF BETTER LAWMAKING (2009); see also Graeme 
B. Dinwoodie, The Development and Incorporation of International Norms in the 
Formation of Copyright Law, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 733, 762–77 (2001); see generally 
Christophe Geiger et al., The Three-Step Test Revisited: How To Use the Test’s 
Flexibility in National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 581 (2014). 
45 For discussion on judicial use of foreign precedents, see Edward Lee, The New 
Canon: Using or Misusing Foreign Law To Decide Domestic Intellectual Property 
Claims, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4–5 (2005). 
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Still, and remarkably different than in the general debate 
between other comparative law scholars, intellectual property 
law scholars who enagage in comparative legal analysis tend to 
be largely immune from methodology related disputes with 
respect to their research.  In other words, the methodological 
controversies vexing mainstream comparative law scholarship do 
not seem to be found, in general, in intellectual property 
comparative legal scholarship.  Instead, intellectual property 
scholars seem to engage in comparative intellectual property 
analysis motivated by a genuine desire to find more information 
about foreign legal systems and to compare these systems with 
their national laws to find actual solutions to existing problems.  
At times, intellectual property scholars are driven to comparative 
legal analysis by the necessity to acquire information with 
respect to the legal treatment of a specific subject matter in other 
legal systems to fill a vacuum in the national law that they are 
investigating or in which they are operating.46  In some 
instances, intellectual property scholars simply compare legal 
texts and judicial decisions in order to acquire the desired 
information.  In other instances, scholars adopt more complex 
methodologies, like comprehensively examining a foreign law as 
it is actually applied in that jurisdiction.  Another method is to 
compare the cultural, economic, and social environments in 
which the foreign legal systems being studied operate.47  Yet, at 
least to the knowledge of this author, intellectual property 
scholars do not seem to have criticized other scholars’ 
methodology because the scholars did not have a sufficient 
immersion in the foreign legal system, or was not able to read 
sources in the original language, and so forth.48  Overall, it seems 
 
46 Again, due to the vast amount of contributions in this respect, it is not 
possible to cite all relevant publications focusing on comparative legal analysis in 
this field. The analysis and the reading of these publications—as well as many 
unpublished doctoral and master dissertations—corroborate, however, the 
conclusion that intellectual property scholars engage in comparative legal analysis 
in large numbers, and do so to assess the status quo of their national and foreign 
laws respectively, and then draw conclusion including with respect to possible legal 
reforms. 
47 See Joahan Bärlund, The Regulation of Comparative Advertising and 
Cultural Variations, in PRIVATE LAW AND THE MANY CULTURES OF EUROPE 269 
(Thomas Wilhelmsson et al. eds., 2007). 
48 To date, it does not seem that any intellectual property scholar has openly 
criticized, at least in a scholarly publication or even in an online newsletter or blog, 
the methodology used by other scholars in conducting comparative legal analysis. 
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that scholars from many countries recognize the importance of 
using comparative legal analysis and the fact that, at some point 
in their research, they may need to investigate comparative 
principles, even when their primary focus is national law. 
Still, even in the absence of known controversies over the 
“perfect” methodology to follow in their research, intellectual 
property scholars engaging in comparative legal analysis also 
face challenges familiar to comparative law scholars.  These 
challenges include navigating the possible theoretical differences 
that exist between national legal systems—for example, the 
differences between civil law and common law.49  Moreover, even 
though intellectual property laws have largely been harmonized 
at the international level, the process of harmonization has 
afforded some latitude to individual countries to craft the 
boundaries of their national systems based on their traditional 
approaches in the field.  Some areas are also far less harmonized 
than other areas.  For example, national laws still diverge 
considerably with respect to protection of moral rights in 
copyright law;50 patent protection and access to medicine—
particularly with respect to compulsory licensing; the nature of 
trademark rights as a property right;51 the protection of 
geographical indications of origin, traditional knowledge, and 
 
This author has conducted a search in several scholarly databases and has not found 
any publication including criticism. The same applies with respect to website. In 
fact, the author was probably the first scholar that wrote a contribution on 
comparative legal analysis applied to intellectual property law as part of the book, 
METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 3 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie 
ed., 2014). This book included presentations from the thirty-first Congress of the 
International Association for Teaching and Research in Intellectual Property 
(ATRIP) held at Chicago Kent College of Law in July 2012. 
49 For a comprehensive analysis of the differences between the common law and 
civil law, see Helge Dedek, From Norms to Facts: The Realization of Rights in 
Common and Civil Private Law, 56 MCGILL L.J. 77 (2010); E. Allan Farnsworth, A 
Common Lawyer’s View of His Civilian Colleagues, 57 LA. L. REV. 227 (1996); John 
Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the 
Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT’L L. 357 (1981). 
50 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary Property in 
Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991, 993 (1990); Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage 
Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17–33 (1985). 
51 See J. Thomas McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark: European Union and 
United States Law Compared, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1163, 1164 (2004). 
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traditional cultural expression;52 exceptions and limitations;53 
and the principle of exhaustion of intellectual property rights and 
the legality of parallel imports.54  In addition, language barriers 
may create further challenges to fully grasp the meaning of the 
legal terminology used in foreign laws, and this may not 
necessarily be clarified with the aid of legal translations.  
Cultural differences, as well as economic and social elements of 
the foreign country, also may complicate scholars’ research and 
assessment of the foreign intellectual property system. 
Overall, however, despite all the challenges, it seems that 
many scholars across the globe agree that the benefit of 
comparative legal analysis outweighs the costs of obtaining the 
information about foreign legal systems.  These costs will 
necessarily vary based on the circumstances, and some scholars 
in various countries may have higher costs than others due to 
greater difficulties in retrieving this information.55  In addition, 
some scholars have a greater incentive, or need, to engage in 
legal comparison because of their personal interests in 
conducting comparative legal analysis regardless of the costs of 
conducting this analysis.  This may be, for example, the case of 
scholars in countries that are former colonies and that have 
inherited the legal systems of the countries that once colonized 
 
52 See J. Janewa Osei-Tutu, A Sui Generis Regime for Traditional Knowledge: 
The Cultural Divide in Intellectual Property Law, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
147, 149–50 (2011). 
53 See, e.g., COPYRIGHT LAW IN AN AGE OF LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS (Ruth 
L. Okediji ed., 2016); Lisa P. Ramsey, Free Speech and International Obligations To 
Protect Trademarks, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 405, 435 (2010); Weijun Zhang & Yanbing 
Li, Content Review and Copyright Protection in China After the 2009 U.S. v. China 
WTO Panel Ruling, 62 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 437 (2015). 
54 See the contributions published in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY EXHAUSTION AND PARALLEL IMPORTS (Irene Calboli & Edward Lee eds., 
2016); Irene Calboli, Market Integration and (the Limits of) the First Sale Rule in 
North American and European Trademark Law, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241 
(2011); Vincent Chiappetta, The Desirability of Agreeing to Disagree: The WTO, 
TRIPs, International IPR Exhaustion and a Few Other Things, 21 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
333 (2000). 
55 In this respect, it should be noted that access to books and scholarly materials 
can be a challenge in many countries with respect to foreign sources, particularly old 
texts, case reports, and legislative history. Scholars in developing countries, or in 
countries with limited resources for academic libraries—today, many countries—
may face further challenges in seeking foreign materials. Even though many 
materials may be found today on online repositories, this is not always the case, 
especially with respect to peer review journals and books, which remain 
predominantly available only via subscription fees. 
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them, or countries that have modeled their legal system after 
foreign jurisdictions, or countries that have harmonized their 
laws following other national systems or regional systems, such 
as the EU.56  Still, while some scholars will have a higher 
incentive or need, the majority of scholars seem to agree on the 
general benefit of conducting comparative legal analysis, at least 
to some degree, in their research. 
As noted in the Introduction, however, recognizng the 
importance of comparative legal analysis does not imply that 
comparative legal analysis should lead to convergence of scholars’ 
opinion on the issues that is researched, or that the 
interpretation of national legal principles of intellectual property 
should become more harmonized across different national laws.57  
Rather, this simply means that, by recognizing the importance of 
comparative legal analysis, intellectual property scholars can 
gain a more comprehensive perspective of relevant foreign laws, 
and be on a stronger position to draw better informed conclusions 
on their research questions, as this analysis would raise 
awareness about foreign rules, cases, and different scholarly 
opinions.  This awareness has become crucially important in our 
global economy to better understand the background of foreign 
legal system, and in turn, the economic and social conditions of 
other countries.  In other words, comparative awareness has 
become a necessity for modern scholars of intellectual property 
law, and scholars who do not engage, at least to a minimum, in 
comparative legal analysis may miss important insights in a field 
of law that is so global and dynamic and that has been heavily 
harmonized at the international and regional level. 
III. THE CASE FOR INCREASING THE RELEVANCE OF COMPARATIVE 
LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE UNITED STATES 
As mentioned in the Introduction, despite the overall success 
of comparative legal analysis as scholary methodology across 
many continents, U.S. legal scholars do not seem to have 
 
56 For example, scholars from countries that were, in the past, British colonies, 
and who have an interest in exceptions and limitations in copyright law may need to 
review their national laws but also British law to comprehensively understand the 
origin of their national provisions. See D’Agostino, supra note 34, at 313–14; David 
Tan, The Unbearable Lightness of Fair Dealing: Towards an Autochthonous 
Approach in Singapore, 28 SING. ACAD. L.J. 124, 124–25 (2016). 
57 See supra Introduction. 
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embraced this methodology with the same enthusiasm or 
frequency that are often seen in other jurisdictions.  This lack of 
enthusiasm—or, perhaps, just lower level of general interest—for 
comparative legal analysis generally seems to be common across 
most legal disciplines in the U.S., including intellectual property 
law,58 even though, at this time, this statement is mosty based on 
the intuition and personal experience of the authors rather than 
on a rigorous empirical analysis and count of all publications 
published in the U.S. by scholars on intellectual property-related 
topics in the past decades.  Moreover, this author would like to 
highlight that, even though many U.S. legal scholars seem to 
engage with less frequency and to a lesser extent with 
comparative legal analysis than non-U.S. scholars, several 
prominent intellectual scholars do indeed regularly conduct, and 
have conducted very important comparative analyses also in the 
U.S.  In the past decades, these scholars have certainly published 
some of the most authoritative studies in this field in the U.S. 
and also internationally.59 
Still, when compared with Europe or Asia, the engagement 
of U.S. scholars in comparative legal analysis does remain a less 
widely used scholarly methodology compared with other methods 
of legal research.60  This statement is corroborated also by the 
fact that many academic conferences, including those dedicated 
to the presentation of scholarly works-in-progress, tend to have  
 
 
58 For a general critique, see Ugo Mattei, Some Realism about Comparativism: 
Comparative Law Teaching in the Hegemonic Jurisdiction, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 87 
(2002). 
59 See generally JANE GINSBURG & EDOUARD TREPPOZ, INTERNATIONAL 
COPYRIGHT LAW: U.S. AND E.U. PERSPECTIVES: TEXT AND CASES (2015); 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AT THE EDGE: THE CONTESTED CONTOURS OF IP (Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss & Jane C. Ginsburg eds., 2014); INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA 
(Paul Goldstein & Joseph Strauss eds., 2009); INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS AND 
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: UNDER A GLOBALIZED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
REGIME (Keith E. Maskus & Jerome H. Reichman eds., 2005). 
60 Graeme B. Dinwoodie, International Intellectual Property Litigation: A 
Vehicle for Resurgent Comparativist Thought?, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 429, 429–30 
(2001) (noting a lack of engagement between intellectual property scholars and 
scholars of conflicts of laws). This limited interest may also derive from a traditional 
internal vision of the United States as exceptional. See Minow, supra note 8, nn.59–
60 (citing ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillips Bradley ed., 
Henry Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1987) (1831); Abraham Lincoln, President of 
the United States, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863), in THE COLLECTED WORKS 
OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN (Ray P. Basler ed., 1953)). 
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fewer numbers of interventions and presentations focusing on 
comparative and international intellectual property than those 
focusing on national law.61 
There are several possible reasons that, most likely 
inadvertently, may have led to this situation of lack of perceived 
relevance of comparative legal analysis as a mainstream research 
methodology by U.S. intellectual property scholars.  In the view 
of this author, none of these reasons include, however, an 
intentional skepticism toward comparative legal analysis as such 
on the part of U.S. scholars.  Instead, the reason for this status 
quo seem to be primarily systemic reasons based both on the 
general characteristics of U.S. legal education as well as the 
development of intellectual property law as a field highly 
dominated by anglo-saxon theories, in particular utilitarian 
theories, and principles not only at the national level but also 
worldwide. 
With respect to the latter, for example, the general principles 
of U.S. intellectual property laws have, in fact, been widely 
disseminated across many jurisdictions as part of the process of 
international harmonization of national laws that has taken 
place since the nineteenth century.  In this respect, it is, in fact, 
not a secret that TRIPS and other international agreements have 
been heavily influenced by the U.S. delegations.  Often, these 
delegations proposed, and obtained, to introduce verbatim 
language from existing U.S. intellectual property laws as part of 
the international agreements.62  This process, which could be 
 
61 In this respect, the very limited number of comparative and international 
intellectual property related scholarly presentations by U.S. scholars at the more 
popular works-in-progress conferences for U.S. law professors is remarkable, at least 
based on the experience of the author of this Essay. These conferences include: 
(1) the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (IPSC), held annually on a rotation 
basis between University of California at Berkeley, Cardozo University, DePaul 
University, and Stanford University; (2) the Works-in-Progress in Intellectual 
Property Conference (WIPIP), held annually but at different academic institutions—
the 2016 edition was hosted by the University of Washington and the 2015 edition 
was hosted by George Washington University and the U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office; and (3) the Internet Law Works-in-Progress Conference, held annually, 
rotating between New York law School and Santa Clara University. Still, these 
conferences provide an unmatchable forum for scholars—junior and senior—to 
present their works-in-progress in the U.S., and the author of this Essay is deeply 
grateful to the comments and feedback on her presentations, and the welcoming 
atmosphere that always distinguishes these events. 
62 For instance, the origin of the fundamental copyright treaty, the Berne 
Convention, are the bilateral agreements by some European states. For a 
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referred to—with a slightly negative connotation—as 
“intellectual property standards colonization,” has intensified in 
the post-TRIPS times with the adoption of bilateral or 
plurilateral FTAs.  Again, these FTAs are heavily influenced by 
U.S. laws and legal principles, which results in these principles 
being adopted by other parties to the FTAs.63  Accordingly, since 
many of the U.S. national standards in the area of intellectual 
property law have been “exported” and “transplanted” into the 
laws of many countries, this may have increased the perception 
among U.S. scholars that legal comparison between the U.S. and 
foreign law is unnecessary, as the laws of foreign countries 
frequently is, in essence, a U.S. law transplant.  In addition, the 
existence of international treaties in so many areas of intellectual 
property law, and in turn the assumption that national laws are 
already almost identical as a result, may have contributed to the 
perception amongst U.S. legal scholars that engaging in 
comparative legal analysis is now irrelevant because all countries 
now adopt virtually the same principles.64 
Prominent comparative scholars have expressed additional 
observations that could assist in explaining the lower level of 
engagement of U.S. scholars in comparative legal analysis in this 
field, and in general.65  To a large extent, these observations refer 
to some common criticism towards the U.S. education system, 
including undergraduate and postgraduate university education.  
Notably, it has been observed that, similar to scholars in other 
English speaking countries, U.S. scholars tend to have a lesser 
command of foreign languages compared to other nationals—who 
must learn at least English as a necessity to write in 
international journals.66  In turn, this may impact the degree of 
 
comprehensive historical introduction in this regard, see 1 SAM RICKETSON & JANE 
C. GINSBURG, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS: THE BERNE 
CONVENTION AND BEYOND ¶¶ 1.29–1.41 (2d ed. 2006). Another example is the 
substantial influence of the U.S. on the international harmonization of computer 
program protection in the copyright regime, so that Article 10(1) of the TRIPs 
Agreement, as the first provision in any multilateral instrument that confirmed the 
protection of computer program as literary works under the Berne Convention. See 
GERVAIS, supra note 40, ¶¶ 2.143–2.153 (4th ed. 2012). 
63 Dinwoodie, supra note 60, at 435. 
64 But see Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The New Copyright Order: Why National 
Courts Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469, 518–19 (2000). 
65 See, e.g., Curran, supra note 7, at 665–67. 
66 This consideration should not be taken as a criticism. However, it should be 
admitted, at least in the experience of this author, that U.S. scholars tend to have, 
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accessibility that U.S. scholars may have with respect to foreign 
laws, even though it is increasingly more common to find most 
legal documents, cases, and scholarship related to foreign laws 
also in English.67  Moreover, more specifically with respect to 
U.S. legal education—and the curriculum in U.S. law schools—it 
has been observed that law schools generally do not include the 
teaching of “Comparative Law” or “International Law” as a core 
subject in the their curricula.68  This approach is considerably 
different than the one adopted in most foreign academic 
institutions that include these subjects as core subjects, if not as 
compulsory course, for students to graduate.  Along the same 
lines, it has been observed that only few U.S. academics seem to 
pursue masters of laws (“LL.M.”) in the U.S. or abroad after 
completing a law degree (“J.D.”), whereas foreign academics tend 
to complete LL.M. courses more frequently, and these courses 
tend to emphasize comparative laws to a higher degree than J.D. 
courses, also when the LL.M. courses are taught in the U.S.69  
 
on average, a less proficient command of foreign languages compared to scholars 
from other parts of the world. Still, some U.S. scholars do engage in learning 
languages as part of Fulbright Programs, or in order to visit foreign institutions for 
extended periods of time. In fact, several of the U.S. colleagues of the author of this 
Essay are proficient in many foreign languages. However, differently than in other 
non-English speaking countries, the value of speaking foreign languages, reading 
legal texts in their original language, and writing and publishing in another 
language does not seem to be perceived with the same importance in the U.S. 
compared to foreign countries. In contrast, non-English speaking scholars 
increasingly more often write and research in English, and usually command well 
two, if not more, foreign languages. 
67 In this matter, WIPO has established a WIPOLex database. WIPO Lex, 
WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en (last visited Nov. 8, 
2016). In this database, a large volume of English literature as well as English 
translations of updated IP laws in the member states can be found. 
68 See the very revealing figures collected by Mattei, supra note 58, at 95–96 
(noting, based on a series of questionnaires, that “in roughly 50% of the U.S. law 
schools, comparative law is a significant part of education of lawyers” and that 
“about 23% of the lawyers produced by these schools receive exposure to comparative 
law, which makes a general figure of about 12% of the general U.S. law graduates 
population,” which leaves “more than 90% of . . . U.S. trained lawyers . . . [with] no 
contact with comparative law during their legal education”). See also Ryan Scoville, 
International Law in National Schools (Marquette Law Sch. Legal Studies, Paper 
No. 16-07, 2016), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2570979. 
69 For example, information about master of laws and postgraduate course in 
intellectual property are widely advertised by several U.S. law schools. See Study 
Patent Law & Intellectual Property Law in United States, MASTERSPORTAL, http:// 
www.mastersportal.eu/study-options/269778993/patent-intellectual-property-law-
united-states.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). U.S. law schools also compete over 
their intellectual property programs and refer to their intellectual property 
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Similarly, it seems that U.S. academics also rarely pursue a 
doctorate in law—S.J.D. or Ph.D in law—a type of degree that 
aspiring academics in foreign countries generally have to 
complete to be considered for a faculty position.  Pursuing a 
doctorate degree in law generally requires comparing different 
legal systems as part of the completion of a doctoral dissertation.  
Instead, many U.S. legal academics obtain doctorate degrees in 
other fields—such as history, statistics, sciences, and so forth70—
but not doctorate degrees in law.  Accordingy, the fact that many 
U.S. intellectual property scholars, and U.S. scholars in general, 
are not exposed to comparative law as law students or as part of 
their doctoral studies could contribute to create the impression of 
a perceived lesser importance of conducting legal comparison as 
part of one’s research agendas later on as a faculty member.71 
Yet, as noted above, even in the post-TRIPS era—the era of 
FTAs and Mega-Regional Agreements—the International 
Community has not achieved a full harmonization of intellectual 
property laws.  Instead, many variations in legislations, and 
interpretation of those legislations, still exist at the national 
level.  As a result, either because the lack of harmonization in 
certain areas, or the existence of international flexibilities in the 
national implementation, or the diverging judicial interpretation 
of similar provisions at the national level by national courts, 
 
curriculum and masters program as part of several distinguishing features of their 
programs. See Intellectual Property Law, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., http://grad-
schools.usnews.rankingsandreviews.com/best-graduate-schools/top-law-schools/intel 
lectual-property-law-rankings (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
70 See Lynn M. LoPucki, Down of the Discipline Based Law Faculty, 65 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 506, 539 (2016); Justin McCrary et al., The Ph.D. Rises in American Law 
Schools, 1960-2011: What Does It Mean for Legal Education?, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 
543, 544 (2016). 
71 Moreover, it should be underlined that the publication system that governs, to 
a large extent, U.S. legal academia does not favor articles addressing comparative 
law topics. In particular, comparative law articles are rarely published in more 
prestigious and sought after U.S. law reviews, which are the mainstream law 
reviews and not the specialty journals that are also published by U.S law schools. 
There is a wide range of reasons for this, including the fact that the selection to be 
published in U.S. law reviews is primarily a process driven by student editors, who 
may not be familiar with comparative law and, thus, less interested in these topics. 
In addition, peer reviews are not considered equally prestigious, in general, by U.S. 
scholars—and tenure committees—which deters scholars from seeking publications 
in peer journals that may be more interested in comparative law. For information 
about the publication process in the U.S., see June Casey, Publishing in Law 
Reviews and Journals, HARV. L. SCH. LIBR. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://guides.library. 
harvard.edu/c.php?g=309907&p=2070141. 
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national laws are not fully harmonized, and will unlikely reach 
full harmonization.72  Accordingly, scholars should always 
consider engaging in comparative legal analysis to study and 
understand the differences that remain between national 
intellectual property laws.73  In this respect, despite its 
challenges, comparative legal analysis will always bring 
important benefits to the understanding of the subject of inquiry 
to any scholar, and thus also to U.S. scholars.  In addition, by 
gaining a specific knowledge of foreign legal systems in a variety 
of legal topics, scholars may turn this knowledge into more 
effective scholarship.  In turn, this more effective scholarship 
could better inform other experts, who could use this additional 
information for more effective advocacy, policy making, and legal 
practice at the national level. 
Overall, by engaging in comparative legal analysis to a 
larger degree, U.S. intellectual property scholars could learn 
more about “the different”—that is, foreign legal systems, 
legislations, case law, etc.—and become more receptive of 
different perspectives and ways of addressing similar issues and 
questions.  In turn, this could promote not only more 
international convergence, but also, and more importantly, more 
international understanding as a whole and respect for 
alternative approaches. 
As I noted also in my earlier scholarship, the fact that the 
benefits of comparative legal analysis generally justify the 
challenges of conducting such analysis, is particularly true in the 
context of intellectual property law.  In the field of intellectual 
property law today, understanding foreign legal systems is a 
necessity for law professors, legal scholars, judges, and legal 
practitioners.  In particular, the enforcement of intellectual 
property laws remains largely territorial,74 and thus it is crucial 
 
72 See discussion supra Part III. 
73 See discussion supra Part III. 
74 But see Alexander Peukert, Territoriality and Extra-territoriality in 
Intellectual Property Law, in BEYOND TERRITORIALITY: TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL 
AUTHORITY IN AN AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 189 (Günther Handl et al. eds., 2012); 
Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 
VA. J. INT’L L. 505, 506 (1997); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Developing a Private 
International Intellectual Property Law: The Demise of Territoriality?, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 711, 765–66 (2009); Graeme B. Dinwoodie, Trademarks and Territory: 
Detaching Trademark Law from the Nation-State, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 885, 887–88, 
(2004). 
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for individuals and businesses interested in securing and 
enforcing intellectual property rights in multiple countries to be 
aware of the details of the various national legal systems in 
which they seek protection.  The ability to understand the 
differences among various legal systems is also crucial in the 
case of multinational or transnational litigation, especially with 
respect to the issue of forum shopping and the choice of law to be 
used in these proceedings.75  Understanding the differences 
between applicable foreign laws has also become a necessity with 
respect to intellectual property transactions.76  Moreover, even 
though the widespread use of the Internet has profoundly 
challenged “the concepts of locus and national borders,”77 the 
solution to Internet-related disputes still remains a matter to be 
resolved at the national level by applying national laws.78  In 
other words, whether comparative legal analysis is used to 
identify the national rules that apply in a specific jurisdiction to 
protect intellectual property assets, or to resolve a dispute taking 
place in cyberspace, comparative legal analysis certainly plays a 
fundamental role in most research questions that are addressed 
as part of intellectual property research.79 
 
75 For a detailed discussion, see Graeme W. Austin, Domestic Laws and Foreign 
Rights: Choice of Law in Transnational Copyright Infringement Litigation, 23 
COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 3 (1999). 
76 This includes the management of intellectual property portfolios 
internationally and the exploitation of intellectual property assets across multiple 
jurisdictions, for example, with respect to licensing, assignments, or the use of 
intellectual property assets as security interests in financial transactions. See 
RUSSELL L. PARR & GORDON V. SMITH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: VALUATION, 
EXPLOITATION, AND INFRINGEMENT DAMAGES 376–77 (2005); see generally 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING (Jacques de Werra 
ed., 2013); THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF TRADEMARK TRANSACTIONS: A GLOBAL AND 
LOCAL OUTLOOK (Irene Calboli & Jacques de Werra ed., 2016). 
77 Raquel Xalabarder, Copyright: Choice of Law and Jurisdiction in the Digital 
Age, 8 GOLDEN ST. U. SCH. L. ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 79, 81 (2002); see Graeme 
W. Austin, Social Policy Choices and Choice of Law for Copyright Infringement in 
Cyberspace, 79 OR. L. REV. 575, 575–76 (2000). 
78 Austin, supra note 75, at 4 (“[A]t least for the time being, the preferable 
approach is for domestic courts to apply relevant foreign law to each instance of 
foreign infringement.”); Dinwoodie, supra note 60, at 447; see also Christian A. 
Camarce, Comment, Harmonization of International Copyright Protection in the 
Internet Age, 19 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 435, 446 (2007); Ted 
Solley, Note, The Problem and the Solution: Using the Internet To Resolve Internet 
Copyright Disputes, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 813, 816 (2008). 
79 In particular, comparative legal analysis enables scholars to identify foreign 
legal information, which is necessary to understand foreign systems and the 
potential impact of these systems on national laws. See Dan L. Burk, Transborder 
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Not surprisingly, businesses and legal practitioners in the 
U.S. have realized the importance of comparative legal analysis 
in intellectual property law for a long time and have been very 
active in creating large international networks of professionals to 
collaborate, learn, and share information about foreign legal 
systems.80  The increasing importance of, and professional 
demand for, comparative legal skills for intellectual property 
lawyers has prompted academic institutions to offer specialized 
postgraduate courses in international and comparative 
intellectual property law, as well as to introduce these subjects as 
part of the regular law school curriculum.81  Post-TRIPS, scholars 
have used comparative legal analysis to comment on FTAs and 
Mega-Regional Agreements, to a large extent to criticize the 
“ratcheting up” of intellectual property protection on a global 
scale.82 
Ultimately, whether it is used to support, criticize, or 
propose amendments to the current international or national 
systems, comparative legal analysis generally leads to 
considerable advancements in the legal discourse both at the 
international and national levels.  Accordingly, it is important 
that comparative legal analysis becomes more widely accepted by 
U.S. intellectual property scholars as a mainstream scholarly 
methodology. 
Certainly, many U.S. intellectual property scholars already 
travel abroad and spend time as visiting academics in foreign 
countries.  As mentioned before, several of them also engage in 
very important comparative legal analysis.  Yet, in many 
instances, U.S. scholars travel abroad primarily to present and/or 
 
Intellectual Property Issues on the Electronic Frontier, 6 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 9, 15 
(1994); Dinwoodie, supra note 64, at 554 n.263; see generally Marshall A. Leaffer, 
Protecting United States Intellectual Property Abroad: Toward a New 
Multilateralism, 76 IOWA L. REV. 273 (1991). 
80 Organizations such as the International Trademark Association (“INTA”) or 
the International Association for the Protection of Intellectual Property (“AIPPI”) 
are just two examples of these networks. For a directory of intellectual property 
professional associations, see Resources, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/ 
intellectual_property_law/resources.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2016). 
81 See Port, supra note 6, at 170–71. 
82 See TRIPS PLUS 20, supra note 42, at 19; see also Charles T. Collins-Chase, 
Comment, The Case Against TRIPS-Plus Protection in Developing Countries Facing 
AIDS Epidemics, 29 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 763, 780 (2008); Maria Julia Oliva, 
Intellectual Property in the FTAA: Little Opportunity and Much Risk, 19 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 45, 60–61 (2003) (noting that draft chapters on IPRs would enact 
heightened standards and deprive countries of the ability to take further measures). 
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teach materials related to U.S. law.  Similarly, U.S. law school 
courses taught abroad often focus on U.S. law and do not seem to 
involve a large comparative component.83  These experiences are 
certainly interesting—and important to advance international 
and comparative understanding both from a cultural and 
academic standpoint.  Still, U.S. scholars could “dive in” in the 
“comparative law world” a little more, and engage more directly 
with foreign legal systems, including studying foreign judicial 
decisions, different types of legal education, judicial and legal 
training, and so forth.  By doing so, U.S. scholars would engage 
to a larger degree with the legal differences of intellectual 
property systems across different countries and the related 
foreign scholarship.  Similarly, U.S. scholars could increase their 
interactions with foreign scholars not only by traveling abroad, 
but also with the scholars who come to the U.S. as visiting 
scholars or to attend L.L.M.s or doctoral programs.  Usually, 
foreign scholars travel to the U.S. to study U.S. law and 
frequently engage in legal comparison between their national 
systems and U.S. law.  A larger number of U.S. scholars could 
take a similar approach and become more acquainted with the 
legal systems of foreign scholars by interacting more frequently 
with these scholars. 
As mentioned before, the result of strengthening the role and 
the perceived importance of comparative legal analysis in the 
U.S. could have a positive impact beyond increasing awareness of 
the foreign laws in scholarly writings by U.S. scholars.  In 
particular, a growing group of U.S. scholars would become better 
acquainted with the cultural, social, and environmental 
differences that still exist across various countries and their legal 
landscapes.  In turn, a growing group of U.S. scholars could have 
relevant influence on national and foreign policy makers, 
international trade negotiators, and practitioners.  In the 
current—controversial—status of international intellectual 
property law, this could even bring about a renewed mutual 
respect for national differences, which could perhaps assist in 
 
83 For a similar critique, see Ryan Scoville & Milan Markovic, How 
Cosmopolitan Are International Law Professors? 13 (Mich. Journal Int’l Law, 
forthcoming; Marquette Law Sch. Legal Studies Paper No. 16-09; Tex. A&M U. Sch. 
of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16-38, 2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2768302 (highlighting how professors of international law in 
the U.S. have little international experience, especially outside the West, and tend to 
teach international law from a national and Western perspective). 
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advancing the dialogue between the various members of the 
International Community, especially between the U.S. and other 
countries, as the U.S. is often perceived as the country that 
wants to impose its will on others with respect to intellectual 
property standards—and much more—regardless of different 
opinions in foreign countries. 
Beyond academics, lawmakers and members of the judiciary 
in the U.S. could also benefit from engaging with comparative 
legal analysis to a higher degree compared to today.  Here, again, 
this should not translate to advocating that lawmakers should 
follow other laws when adopting national legislation, nor that 
judges should consider foreign judicial precedents as persuasive 
authority.  National legal systems do remain distinct, and the 
judicial-making process and the validity of judicial precedents 
greatly vary among countries and legal systems—for example, 
common law and civil law.  Moreover, modeling national laws 
after foreign laws could easily result in the adoption of 
inappropriate legal transplants, that is, legal irritants, which 
may be later rejected or not properly enforced.84  Similarly, 
foreign judicial precedents may prove incorrect and unworkable 
for national judges, even in cases dealing with the same plaintiffs 
and defendants, because of the different facts of each national 
scenario.85  Still, lawmakers, judges, and other legal actors would 
nonetheless benefit by engaging in comparative legal analysis 
simply by becoming aware of existing foreign laws, cases, and 
relevant legal precedents.  Gathering a greater awareness about 
“the different” always translates into providing different 
perspective, which in turn can serve to better define the contours 
of specific legal issues at the national level. 
 
84 See David Nelken, Comparatists and Transferability, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 437, 441 (Pierre Legrand & Roderick 
Munday eds., 2003); see also Roberto Garza Barbosa, The Philosophical Approaches 
to Intellectual Property and Legal Transplants. The Mexican Supreme Court and 
NAFTA Article 1705, 31 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 515, 564 (2009); Peter K. Yu, Digital 
Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 
693, 699 (2010) (discussing the complicated nature of transplantation). 
85 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND LEGAL THEORY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 
21–30 (1996) (describing differences in American and European judiciary systems); 
see also Jeffrey L. Friesen, When Common Law Courts Interpret Civil Codes, 15 WIS. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 12–13 (1996). But see Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 
Term—Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 84–90 (2005) (criticizing 
the use of foreign law in Roper v. Simmons). 
FINAL_CALBOLI 2/14/2017  10:46 PM 
2016] COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS IN THE U.S. 637 
Finally, in order to welcome a large number of scholars, it 
remains important that intellectual property scholars worldwide 
continue to avoid requiring complex methodologies for those 
conducting, or attempting to conduct, legal comparison.  As 
mentioned earlier, to date, intellectual property scholars have 
been largely immune to the doctrinal quibbles that have 
characterized other areas of comparative law.  This is an 
important strength of the comparative intellectual property 
academic community, which should be maintained.86  Of course, 
comparative legal analysis should be conducted with rigor and 
scholarly precision, but we should not dictate a specific, “perfect” 
or “single exclusive method,” to follow for scholars who engage in 
comparison, especially at the beginning.87  For example, we 
should not impose the requirement that scholars necessarily turn 
to the original language documents when scholars do not speak 
that language; English translations of many legal documents are 
already appropriate and sufficient sources to conduct 
comparative legal analyses.  More specifically, all scholars who 
desire to conduct some comparative analysis should be welcome 
to do so.  Scholars should, instead, be led to follow an incremental 
approach in their analyses, or “a sliding scale of methods,”88 and 
select the best approach that scholars would prefer based on “the 
specific purpose of the research . . . and the affordability of the 
costs.”89  Ultimately, engaging in comparative legal analysis 
always benefits intellectual property scholars, at every level of 
engagement, and those already engaging in comparative legal 
analysis should facilitate that more scholars enter the field and 
encourage them. 
CONCLUSION 
This Essay has highlighted the important role of 
comparative legal analysis as a scholarly methodology and 
advocated that the relevance of this methodology could be 
strengthened amongst intellectual property scholars in the U.S.  
In particular, this Essay has supported that comparative legal 
analysis can offer additional information about diverse 
perspectives on the justification of intellectual property norms 
 
86 See supra Part II. 
87 Palmer, supra note 21, at 290. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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and the application of these norms in different national contexts.  
This information is relevant to all scholars, including all of us in 
the U.S., for a more comprehensive evaluation of a variety of 
intellectual property issues, as intellectual property laws remain 
territorial laws despite decades of intensive international 
harmonization. 
Certainly, comparative legal analysis brings about 
challenges, such as the need to search for and the use of foreign 
legal materials, understanding foreign languages or navigate 
possible ambiguities in legal translation, or even the need to 
become exposed to foreign legal systems from a cultural and 
sociological standpoint.  Hence, in the majority of instances, the 
benefits of comparative legal analysis compensate for the 
challenges created, primarily the ability to better understand 
legal and cultural differences.  This understanding is crucial to 
promote additional collaboration amongst scholars, policy 
makers, judges, and other legal actors in different countries. 
Ultimately, comparative legal analysis teaches us about 
possible alternatives and different insights.  Some of these are 
necessarily provocative and controversial.  Morever, comparative 
legal analysis may take many of us outside our comfort zone and 
the comfort of our national legal system.  Yet, it always teaches 
us something new and valuable, and thus it should become an 
important methodology for all of us in the field of intellectual 
property law. 
